Negative Brief: Taiwan Submarines – bad idea

By Coach Vance Trefethen

***Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reform its foreign aid.***

Summary: AFF plan donates 8 surplus US nuclear submarines to Taiwan for them to use in defense of their island against potential aggression from mainland China. This is a bad idea, first because nuclear submarines are entirely useless for Taiwan’s defense. They may need submarines, but not nuclear, because nuclear subs can’t operate effectively in the shallow waters between Taiwan and mainland China. No experts recommend this plan, probably for that reason. Instead, the Status Quo is already doing diesel-electric submarines, which is what Taiwan wants. Even if they get them, it won’t make much difference. All it does is make China mad and hurt US foreign policy.

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Negative: Taiwan Submarines – bad idea

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Counter Criterion: Better US foreign relations with China. This should be our foreign policy goal because improving the US relationship with China is critical for us and the rest of the world

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** - the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

The PRC has gone through years of great tribulations, and is in the process of both exercising and returning to great power status in the world. The United States is also adjusting to China’s rise to world power. Arguably, the U.S. relationship with China is the largest and most critical one for us to get right. This immense, multifaceted relationship encompassing political, economic, cultural, and military aspects is generally stable. The relationship has the potential to be much better, not only for China and the U.S., but for a world that can only benefit from a more stable, more predictable and more positive future.

Improved US/China relationship is imperative

Retired Admiral Bill Owens 2009 (former vice-chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff) 17 Nov 2009 America must start treating China as a friend https://hibikan.at.webry.info/200911/index.html

The US-China relationship is a vital interest for the two countries and the world. Throughout history, great powers have tended to become adversaries. Now, for a few years, we have a chance to break that cycle. It will take strong and enduring commitment on both sides. But a new and engaging relationship is imperative for our common good.

The US and China have potential for much better relationship, and the world would benefit from it

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** is the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

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INHERENCY

1. Taiwan already getting diesel subs in Status Quo

State Department has approved US diesel technology for Taiwan, and contractors are ready to start

Franz-Stefan Gady 2018 (senior editor with The Diplomat) 11 Apr 2018 “US Grants Licenses to Help Taiwan Build Fleet of Attack Subs” THE DIPLOMAT https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/us-grants-licenses-to-help-taiwan-build-fleet-of-attack-subs/

The U.S. Department of State has approved licenses for U.S. defense contractors to sell sensitive U.S.-made submarine technology to Taiwan to support the construction of a yet to be determined number of domestically-designed and -produced diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) for the Republic of China Navy (ROCN), [according](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3400051) to local media reports. Two U.S. defense companies interested in collaborating with China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC), the country’s only listed shipbuilder, and the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology on the Indigenous Defense Subin marine (IDS) program initially submitted requests for marketing licenses in 2017 and have reportedly been granted this month.

Taiwan subs will be operational in 2026

Franz-Stefan Gady 2018 (senior editor with The Diplomat) 11 Apr 2018 “US Grants Licenses to Help Taiwan Build Fleet of Attack Subs” THE DIPLOMAT https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/us-grants-licenses-to-help-taiwan-build-fleet-of-attack-subs/

 The ROCN plans foresees a fleet of eight attack submarines with the first SSK entering sea-trials by 2024 followed by its first operational deployment in 2026: As I [reported](https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/taiwan-to-build-own-attack-submarines-within-next-10-years/) in March 2017, the IDS is divided up into two phases:   
The first phase consists of completing design work on Taiwan’s new class of attack subs for the government allocated approximately NT$2 billion ($65.66 million). The second stage entails the construction of the new boats with the ambitious goal of finishing construction in eight years and commissioning the subs into service with the ROCN within a decade. (Each sub could cost as much as $1 billion, according to The Diplomat estimates.)

Taiwan 8-12 submarine plan already underway

Franz-Stefan Gady 2018 (senior editor with The Diplomat) 11 Apr 2018 “US Grants Licenses to Help Taiwan Build Fleet of Attack Subs” THE DIPLOMAT https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/us-grants-licenses-to-help-taiwan-build-fleet-of-attack-subs/

The Taiwan-based China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC) – the country’s main ship-building company – sought the government contract and almost immediately initiated a submarine [development center in Kaohsiung](https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=6,23,45,6,6&post=102418). Taiwan envisioned the development of eight to 12 submarines over the span of two decades, with the first system to enter into service in 2026. With the assistance of the United States – officialized when Congress voted for the defense act of 2018, offering Taiwan technical support for its submarine program – Taipei’s aim is to revamp the existing fleet.

SIGNIFICANCE / HARMS

1. Taiwan not worried

Low defense spending means Taiwan doesn’t act as if there’s much of a threat

Bonnie Glaser and Anastasia Mark 2015 (Glaser is a senior adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is also a senior associate with Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Pacific Forum and a consultant for the U.S. government on East Asia. Mark is a Masters candidate at Georgetown’s Asia Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service and works as an intern for CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Project. She has over four years of experience living in China) Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 18 Mar 2015 TAIWAN’S DEFENSE SPENDING: THE SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF CHOOSING BUTTER OVER GUNS <http://amti.csis.org/taiwans-defense-spending-the-security-consequences-of-choosing-butter-over-guns/>

Second, Taipei’s low defense spending raises questions about Taiwan’s commitment to its own defense, which could have implications for U.S. willingness to help defend the island in the event of a PRC attack. Why, then, is Taiwan not allocating greater resources to defense? A major factor is the improvement in cross-Strait relations, which has importantly lowered the risk of conflict, but has also [reduced public perception](http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/472810562541.gif) of the threat from Mainland China. Since coming to power in 2008, Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has overseen a new phase of stabilization in China-Taiwan relations in which economic and social exchanges have expanded dramatically. As a result, Taiwan’s citizens’ fears of a military attack have receded.

2. No Mainland Threat

China lacks amphibious attack capability to invade Taiwan

Greg Austin 2015 (Professorial Fellow with the EastWest Institute in New York and a Visiting Professor at the Australian Centre for Cyber Security at the University of New South Wales, Canberra, at the Australian Defence Force Academy ) 17 Feb 2015 US China Commission Moves Beyond the 'China Threat' Hype THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/us-china-commission-moves-beyond-the-china-threat-hype/> (brackets added)

Such questions are, one assumes, among the departure points of the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on the military developments in the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. Yet in the 2014 [Pentagon report](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf), the word weakness does not seem to appear. The word “lack” appears only twice, and the word “shortcoming” appears only twice. But the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] shortcomings are so profound, as the 200-page RAND report suggests, that they probably need a lot more attention in public than the Pentagon has been willing (or politically brave enough) to discuss or canvas objectively. For example, the Pentagon report notes that China “lacks the amphibious lift capacity that a large-scale invasion of Taiwan would require.” So surely that must affect the type of threat China represents to United States interests. That is a pretty big “weakness” on the only significant military confrontation dividing China and the United States.

Chinese military (PLA – People’s Liberation Army) is weak and cannot carry out substantial missions

RAND Corporation research report sponsored by the US-China Economic & Security Review Commission 2015. (RAND is a non-profit research organization. US-CE&SRC is an agency created by Congress to study US-China foreign policy. This study’s authors were: Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz ) Feb 2015 China’s Incomplete Military Transformation - Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Incomplete%20Military%20Transformation_2.11.15.pdf>

We have found that the PLA suffers from potentially serious weaknesses. These shortcomings could limit its ability to successfully conduct the information-centric, integrated joint operations Chinese military strategists see as required to fight and win future wars. Chinese military writers and outside analysts generally agree that these weaknesses fall into two broad categories. The first is institutional. The PLA faces shortcomings stemming from outdated command structures, quality of personnel, professionalism, and corruption. The second set of weaknesses centers on combat capabilities. These shortcomings include logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air defense and antisubmarine warfare. Although the PLA’s capabilities have improved dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Communist Party leaders may task it to execute, such as in various Taiwan contingencies, maritime claim missions, sea line of communication protection, and some military operations other than war scenarios.

3. No moral imperative to support Taiwan

US policy must be based on US security, we have no obligation to do what other countries want us to do

Prof. Charles Glaser 2011. (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

Douglas Paal, meanwhile, believes that the people of Taiwan should have a large say in U.S. decision-making. International politics, however, rarely works this way. Especially when important national security interests are at stake, states make foreign policy decisions based on their own interests. Friends, allies, and adversaries may not like these decisions, but they have little choice but to adapt to them.

SOLVENCY

1. No maintenance or training

Link: AFF plan gives Taiwan nuclear subs, but doesn't give them training, facilities or maintenance

That's what their plan says.

Link: It takes far more than a decade to develop nuclear maintenance capabilities. Just ask Australia

Marise Payne 2017. (Australian Defense Minister) quoted by journalist Greg Jennett, 29 June 2017 Tony Abbott regrets not challenging Australia's 'no-go' mindset on nuclear power https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-29/tony-abbott-regrets-not-challenging-australian-nuclear-mindset/8664482

"Australia currently lacks the qualified personnel, experience, infrastructure, training facilities and regulatory systems required to design, construct, operate and maintain a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines," she said in a statement. "Developing this capability domestically would take far longer than a decade.

Failure: No working subs

Unless AFF reads evidence that Taiwan has the money and willingness to spend far more than a decade building teams who can operate and maintain nuclear subs, the plan fails. The subs won’t operate themselves with no crews and no maintenance. They’ll just sit in the dock and collect rust.

2. Nuclear subs won’t work in the Taiwan scenario

Shallow waters. The Strait between the island of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland is too shallow for nuclear subs to operate

Japan Times 2017. (Japanese newspaper) 19 July 2017 “U.S. Navy destroyer monitored Chinese carrier in Taiwan Strait: report” <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/19/asia-pacific/u-s-navy-destroyer-monitored-chinese-carrier-taiwan-strait-report/#.W9ewBmhKhPY>

The China Times reported that it was rare for U.S. naval vessels to enter the Taiwan Strait, a 160-km-wide body of water separating Taiwan and mainland China, and that this move carries a high degree of military and political significance. The Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyer and Taiwan warships monitored the passage from the Taiwan side of the strait, it said. In addition to the destroyer, the report said, the U.S. Navy also deployed a nuclear-powered submarine to waters near Taiwan to gather intelligence. But it did not enter the strait, which is generally considered to be too shallow for nuclear submarine operations.

Nuclear subs can’t fight effectively in shallow water. They’re too big and noisy!

**[That must be why AFF couldn’t find anyone who endorses their plan]**

Hans J. Ohff 2017. (visiting research fellow at University of Adelaide, Australia, and former CEO of the Australian Submarine Corporation) Nuclear versus diesel-electric: the case for conventional submarines for the RAN 11 July 2017 <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-versus-diesel-electric-case-conventional-submarines-ran/> (brackets added)

In addition to long endurance, nuclear power provides an SSN [nuclear submarine] with a sustained submerged speed of over 30 knots. That translates into far-reaching, covert mobility that outperforms surface units in any navy’s inventory. SSKs lack speed, but the size of an SSN limits effective deployments in the littorals and estuaries, and its size gives a larger echo strength, increasing the probability of detection. Thus, there are operational missions for which SSNs are not suited.

Nuclear subs aren’t useful in shallow water: Too easy to detect, and their cooling water intake gets contaminated

Hans J. Ohff 2017. (visiting research fellow at University of Adelaide, Australia, and former CEO of the Australian Submarine Corporation) Nuclear versus diesel-electric: the case for conventional submarines for the RAN 11 July 2017 <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/nuclear-versus-diesel-electric-case-conventional-submarines-ran/> (brackets added)

Operating a submarine at less than 2 knots only metres above an irregular seabed, or bottoming undetected for a prolonged period, are tasks best suited to an SSK. Notwithstanding the advances made in anechoic tiling and the benefits of ambient noise prevalent in shallow waters, the acoustic signature of an SSN’s nuclear reactor and its associated appurtenances will rarely be hidden. The infrared signature of a nuclear power plant is detectable in nearly all sea states due to the thermal structure of wave patterns. Close to the ocean floor, the cooling-water intake on SSNs could be prone to collecting contaminants.

3. Not enough military personnel available

Taiwan Navy can’t recruit enough staff for 8 submarines

Franz-Stefan Gady 2018 (senior editor with The Diplomat) 11 Apr 2018 “US Grants Licenses to Help Taiwan Build Fleet of Attack Subs” THE DIPLOMAT https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/us-grants-licenses-to-help-taiwan-build-fleet-of-attack-subs/

The question of how the [ROC Navy recruits](https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/is-taiwans-military-becoming-too-small-to-fight/) enough staff for its new fleet of submarines ushers in a difficult reality. With dwindling recruitment [numbers](https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/taiwans-all-volunteer-force-pains-theres-a-way-out/), the all-volunteer-force has attracted criticism and has even been labeled as a failed experiment. A declining appetite among Taiwan’s younger generations to join the military is becoming increasingly apparent. Whether or not Taiwan can recruit, train, and operate sufficient personnel for eight submarines remains a pressing question.

4. No objective criterion for success

We can’t know what weapons Taiwan needs because they don’t have a clear defense strategy

Wendell Minnick 2015 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 27 May 2015 DEFENSE NEWS Taiwan Pushes for New Weapons on All Fronts <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/warfare/2015/05/27/taiwan-requirements-submarine-frigate-destroyer-helicopter-budget-china/26860647/>

When the US government or a US think tank complains that the Taiwanese are not spending enough on defense, they are talking about dollar value, not quality, said Ching Chang, research fellow for the conservative ROC Society for Strategic Studies. "Value is subjective," he said. "How can you decide what kind of weapons you need when you do not know what size of military force you will have in 10 years? Do you prepare to fight China based on force levels of the past, with 300,000 troops? This would be very different from the current 170,000 troops. What about a reduced force of 100,000? How can the US define the value of Taiwan's budget numbers based solely on how much US weapons they procure?"

5. Little security benefit

A few submarines won’t make any difference in Taiwan’s defense

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/>

As for the number eight, whether this is in line with Taiwan’s future defense needs is also doubtful. Given the maintenance cycle, only four or five submarines will be combat ready when in contingency. This number is extremely low for Taiwan’s maritime defense, either in tactically centralized or dispersive deployment. In a real conflict, “better than nothing” is of little comfort.

6. No military solution.

Taiwan military study concludes that no amount of US military support could save Taiwan from Chinese attack

Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

In practice, if not yet rhetorically, Taipei also seems to have altered its military strategy, including its approach to arms purchases from the United States. The military balance in the Taiwan Strait has shifted so decisively in favor of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that it’s no longer possible to sustain the fantasy that an island of 23 million people can balance the military power of a dynamic society of 1.3 billion. Whatever the answer to Taiwan’s continued survival as a prosperous democratic society may be, it’s not military. By 2020, according to a recent report from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the PLA may be able to overwhelm the island even in the face of armed U.S. opposition. This finding leads ineluctably to a judgment that cross-Strait challenges must be met by political rather than military means. Such a judgment is implicit in the fact that Taipei’s defense budget has been shrinking, while Beijing’s continues its rapid growth.

Even Taiwan knows that their arms requests don’t really matter – they’re only for political value

Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

In the past, Taipei sought approval of weapons purchases from Washington as much or more for their political value as tokens of American politico-military support as for their contributions to its defense. Taipei still asks for advanced American weaponry, but there is now no money and not much oomph behind these requests. They hold Taiwan’s military-industrial constituency in America in thrall to continuing dreams of a lucrative arms market.

Advanced weaponry for Taiwan would have no effect on security – the balance of power is irreversibly in favor of China

Retired Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr 2013. (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; and former Director of Chinese Affairs at the US State Department) 16 Nov 2013 The Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle, Remarks to an Academic Seminar at the Miller Center, University of Virginia <http://chasfreeman.net/beijing-taipei-washington-triangle/>

Taipei still asks for advanced American weaponry, but there is now no money and not much oomph behind these requests. They hold Taiwan’s military-industrial constituency in America in thrall to continuing dreams of a lucrative arms market. If realized, however, these sales would not have much, if any, effect on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. With that balance now irreversibly in favor of the mainland, U.S. weapons transfers cannot boost the island’s sense of security as they once did. Still less do U.S. arms sales serve to embolden Taiwan’s political elite to defy Beijing or the logic of eventual reunification with the mainland, as Beijing long supposed they did.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Chinese Espionage

Link: Taiwanese officers sell naval military secrets to mainland China

Lu Chen 2013 (journalist) EPOCH TIMES 28 Oct 2013 Taiwanese Major Sells Military Secrets to China https://www.theepochtimes.com/taiwanese-major-sells-military-secrets-to-china\_332274.html

Cases of Taiwanese officers selling military secrets to mainland China, or acting as spies for Chinese forces, crop up periodically. Eight retired officials from Taiwan’s navy were arrested last year for selling information about naval vessels and waters surrounding Taiwan, [according to Hong Kong media](http://www.takungpao.com/news/content/2012-10/30/content_1315280.htm).


Impact: Turn Affirmative’s “Chinese Threat” harms. Chinese military development raises the challenges to Taiwan’s security

US Dept of Defense 2013. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 (first brackets added, second brackets, quotations, and ellipses in original) [https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress\_djvu.txt](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.org/stream/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress/696882-dept-of-defence-annual-report-to-congress_djvu.txt&sa=D&ust=1443092014881000&usg=AFQjCNGjKtVwX1slF_VonbJs6Ph52dBjhw)

Alongside positive public statements about the Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders in China following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, however, there have been no signs that China’s military disposition opposite Taiwan has changed significantly. The PLA has developed and deployed military capabilities to coerce Taiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary. These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security, which has been based historically upon the PLA’s inability to project power across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait, natural geographic advantages of island defense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technological superiority, and the possibility of U.S. intervention.

Impact: Hurts US businesses and national security. Chinese technology theft hurts US business interests and threatens national security

Dr. Edward J. Maggio 2009 (PhD; Assistant Professor, Criminal Justice, New York Institute of Technology ) Private Security in the 21st Century <https://books.google.fr/books?id=CZNdwscVq1EC&pg=PA303&lpg=PA303&dq=national+security+china+technology+theft&source=bl&ots=suyk2A9RLt&sig=yLxYPeKuuZxb3dXfQxWfga0Wpzk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAzgKahUKEwjHk8712Z7GAhWBaRQKHa8XABo#v=onepage&q=national%20security%20china%20technology%20theft&f=false>



2. China Gets Mad

Link: Selling subs to Taiwan will anger China

Wendell Minnick 2009 (B.S., M.A., is an author, commentator, journalist and speaker who has spent two decades covering military and security issues in Asia, including one book on intelligence and over 1,000 articles; currently Asia Bureau Chief for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/), a Washington-based defense weekly newspaper) 19 Oct 2009 Lacking Boats, Taiwan Sub Office in U.S. May Shut Down <http://minnickarticles.blogspot.fr/2009/10/lacking-boats-taiwan-sub-office-in-us_19.html>

In 2001, the administration of President George W. Bush offered to build Taiwan eight diesel-electric submarines. However, the United States has not been able to carry out that deal because it no longer builds non-nuclear submarines, and third-country manufacturers have been reluctant to anger China by selling subs to Taiwan. The sale has been in limbo ever since.

Brink: When subs were first proposed in 2001, China said they would cross a red line because they’re offensive, not defensive

CNN 2001. “Beijing anger expected over U.S.-Taiwan arms sales” 24 Apr 2001 <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/23/taiwan.arms/index.html>

Beijing had promised dire consequences if the United States sold the Aegis system to Taiwan. But it also considers submarines to be offensive weapons and therefore, in its view, not covered by terms of the Taiwan Relations Act that pledges U.S. support for the island democracy's defenses. "I think there will be some substantive actions and this will come very soon," said Wu Xinbo, a professor at the Fudan University Centre for American Studies in Shanghai. Wu, who writes on U.S.-China security issues, said China had considered submarines as "red-line" items on Taiwan's defense shopping list, along with the Aegis system and the PAC-3 missile defense system.

Brink: Submarine sales to Taiwan would cross a red line for China on US/China relations

Wang Jyh-Perng & Tan Chih-lung 2015. (Wang Jyh-Perng is a reserve captain in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at Beijing University. Tan Chih-lung is a Navy Reserve Rear Admiral in the ROCN and is currently pursuing his Ph.D. at National Sun Yet-Sen University, Taiwan.) Taiwan’s Submarine Saga 11 May 2015 THE DIPLOMAT <http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwans-submarine-saga/> (brackets added)

Since China condemns the U.S. for every arms sale, even that involving used warships, any U.S. assistance – direct or indirect – in Taiwan’s efforts to acquire submarines will all no doubt cross the “red line” drawn by China. The reaction is likely to be stronger than that when the U.S. approved the sale of 150 F-16 A/B fighters in 1992 or in this recent Perry-class case. The impact on Sino-U.S. relations of the submarine sale will be a critical factor for the U.S. to consider.

Impact: The most important foreign policy goal is US-China cooperation. We need China to solve every major global challenge

US-China Smart Power Commission 2009(chaired by former US Defense Secretary William Cohen and Maurice R. Greenberg), March 2009, "Smart Power in US-China Relations," CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf>

The evolution of Sino-US relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable US alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of US and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of US-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without US-China cooperation.

Impact: Worsens cycle of tensions and problems in US/China/Taiwan relations

Miller Center of Public Affairs at the Univ. of Virginia 2011 (report of a conference of experts, managed by: **Admiral Joseph W. Prueher** is the Miller Center’s James R. Schlesinger Distinguished Professor; consulting professor at Stanford University’s Institute of International Studies; former US Ambassador to China. **Heather Mullins Crislip** is a Visiting Fellow coordinating the Miller Center’s Policy Programs. She also served as the Staff Director of the David R. Goode National Transportation Conference at the Miller Center. **Taylor Reveley** is the Associate Director of the Miller Center. He has served as the coordinating attorney for the Center's National War Powers Commission, co-chaired by Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher. Mr. Reveley previously was an attorney with Hunton & Williams) “A Way Ahead With China” 2011 <http://web1.millercenter.org/conferences/chinaroundtable-report.pdf>

A peaceful resolution of the long standing Taiwan issue, acceptable on both sides of the strait would indeed be a boon to stability in East Asia, as well as to U.S./China relations. It is also an issue where progress can be made. Taiwan has over time and with our encouragement become an economically successful democratic polity. Unfortunately, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are part of a vicious circle, leading to the Taiwan issue that is clearly political, and increasingly economic, being always discussed in military terms. The solution to the Taiwan issue is not a military one, so we should discuss it in the layers of economy, politics, and culture.

Backup: Stopping Taiwan arms sales is key to improving US/China relations

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2013 (PhD in US diplomatic history; senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) 7 Nov 2013 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: A Delicate, Troublesome Issue <http://www.cato.org/blog/us-arms-sales-taiwan-delicate-troublesome-issue>

However, arms sales of any sort to Taipei have long been a major irritant in U.S.-China relations. Chinese leaders have never wavered in their contention that Taiwan is rightfully a part of China, and they view U.S. weapons sales as provocative. Beijing is especially wrathful about transfers of modern weapons with offensive potential. Selling the advanced F-16 models, the Apaches, or the Patriots would likely produce a surge in bilateral tensions. Washington and Beijing are already on poor terms regarding other issues, especially the Obama administration’s unsubtle support for East Asian countries challenging China’s territorial claims in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. U.S. officials need to proceed with considerable caution on the issue of arms sales. Understandably, Washington would like to see Taiwan maintain its de facto independence and remain out of Beijing’s political orbit. But a cordial relationship with China is important to America, both strategically and economically. The last thing this country needs is a renewed crisis in East Asia.

Backup: Taiwan arms sales damage US/China relationship and China/Taiwan relationship

Reuters news service 2014. China angered by latest U.S. arms sale plan for Taiwan 9 Apr 2014 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/09/us-china-usa-taiwan-idUSBREA380H520140409>

China's defense ministry expressed anger on Wednesday after the U.S. House of Representatives agreed to authorize the sale to Taiwan of four second-hand U.S. warships, saying the United States had ignored Chinese protests. China and Taiwan have been ruled separately since defeated Nationalist forces fled to the island at the end of a civil war with the communists in 1949. China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. The U.S. legislation also reaffirmed the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the United States to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of an attack, and was enacted in 1979 when Washington severed formal ties with the island in favor of recognizing the People's Republic of China in Beijing. China's defense ministry said it was resolutely opposed to all arms sales to Taiwan, saying it was an interference in China's internal affairs. "The U.S. side ignored China's strong opposition, and insisted on passing the bill pushing weapons sales to Taiwan," the ministry said in a statement on its website ([www.mod.gov.cn](http://www.mod.gov.cn)). "This act is highly damaging, and doubtless will seriously interfere in and damage the development of Sino-U.S. military ties and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations."

Backup: Taiwan is the most crucial issue in US/China relations, and arms sales hurt the relationship

Arms Control Association 2012 (national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies) updated Oct 2012 U.S. Conventional Arms Sales to Taiwan <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/taiwanarms>

China, which claims Taiwan is the "most crucial and most sensitive issue" in its relations with the United States, maintains that U.S. arms sales to Taipei infringe on China's sovereignty because Washington acknowledges that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing also charges that sales contradict the U.S.-China joint communiqué issued August 17, 1982. That document stated that the United States  
"Does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution."

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